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Comment: What Level of Intent is Required to Prove 
Inequitable Conduct? 
A patent is a legal instrument with which an inventor can protect 
his investment of money and effort in an invention. The inventor, by 
fully disclosing his invention to the government, 1 receives the right to 
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention within the 
United States. 2 In essence, a patent represents a contract between the 
United States and the inventor. 3 The government's contract power 
stems from the Constitution,4 which authorizes Congress "[t]o promote 
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for a limited time 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings 
and discoveries. " 5 The primary purpose of this constitutional provision 
is not to reward the individual, but to promote science for the "general 
welfare of the nation."6 The public, therefore, has a high interest in 
seeing that the patent process is free from fraud. 7 
Because of the significant public interest in the patent system, both 
patent applicants and their attorneys owe an uncompromising duty to 
report to the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") all 
facts relevant to the patent process. A person who violates this duty 
may be charged with "inequitable conduct," the specific term for fraud-
ulent procurement of a patent. 8 A patent obtained through inequitable 
conduct is unenforceable. 9 As a result, inequitable conduct is often an 
affirmative defense in patent infringement suits. A defendant, by claim-
ing that the patentee procured the patent through inequitable conduct, 
1. 35 l'.S.C. § 112 ( 1982) 
2. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969). 
3. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832). 
4. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
5. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S 1, 5 (1965). 
6. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S 327. 330-31 (1945). 
7. See True Temper Corp. v. CF & I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 501 (10th Cir. 1979)(pat-
ent applicant stands in a confidential relationship to the PTO and has an absolute duty of full and 
complete disclosure to help the Office in developing patent claims). 
8. See Precision lnstr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 ( 1945 ). 
When a patent applicant fails to uphold his duty of candor and good faith, and procures a patent 
by withholding material information from, or submitting false information to the PTO, the appli-
cant is said to have procured his patent through inequitable conduct or fraud on the PTO. 
9. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984), rert. denied, 
474 U.S. 822 (1985). A finding of inequitable conduct may also result in criminal punishment of 
culpable parties, and there is a possibility of liability under antitrust laws. A discussion of these 
potential liabilities is beyond the scope of this comment. 
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may avoid liability for his patent infringement. Additionally, in ex 
parte proceedings, the PTO has invalidated patents due to inequitable 
conduct where the patent practitioner has breached his duty of candor 
to the Patent Office. 10 
Courts today impose a greater burden of proof upon a party seek-
ing to prove inequitable conduct than did courts of a decade ago. In 
order to prove inequitable conduct, two elements must be shown: 1) 
materiality of information, and 2) intent to mislead. However, courts 
disagree upon the amount of proof required to satisfy each of these 
elements, particularly with respect to intent to mislead. In two recent 
cases,11 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
("CAFC"), significantly raised the threshold level of proof required to 
show intent to mislead the PTO. These CAFC decisions hold that 
proof of gross negligence, without proof of actual intent to mislead, is 
insufficient to meet the intent threshold for a finding of inequitable 
conduct. This new standard has altered the PTO's approach to inequi-
table conduct problems. 12 
The recent CAFC decisions establish a standard of proof for ineq-
uitable conduct that is more consistent with the primary purposes of 
patent law. This comment first examines the evolution of inequitable 
conduct from its common law fraud origin into a standard that en-
couraged litigation and prompted courts to focus predominantly on the 
actions of the patentee rather than on the merits of the patentee's in-
vention. Second, it examines the development of the new heightened-
intent standard, a standard that both effectively reduces the number of 
inequitable conduct claims that will be raised in court, and changes the 
focus of many patent cases to one concentrating on the merits of the 
invention. Finally, it concludes that the recent CAFC decisions estab-
lish a standard of proof for inequitable conduct that will prevent fraud 
on the PTO and, at the same time, promote useful art and technology, 
I 0. Grounds upon which findings of inequitable conduct have been found include: I) misrep-
resentations in patent applications oaths or declarations, see, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. 
Food Mach. & Chern. Co., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); 2) misrepresentations in affidavits, see, e.g., 
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern. Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 3) misrepresentation or 
inadequate disclosure of prior art or other information, see, e.g., Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark 
Boats, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
414 U.S. 874 (1973); 4) nondisclosure of material prior art, see, e.g., Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre 
Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 5) non-disclosure of evidence of prior 
public use and sale, see, e.g., Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. Co., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965). 
II. See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In Re Harita, 847 
F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988). These decisions are discussed in detail, see infra text accompanying 
notes 64-90. 
12. See infra text accompanying notes I 02 to 106 for the PTO's most recent policy changes 
regarding inequitable conduct. 
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thus furthering the primary purposes of the patent system. 
I. BACKGROUND - THE EvoLUTION oF THE INEQUITABLE 
CoNDUCT DocTRINE 
387 
A. Merging Common Law Fraud and the Doctrine of "Unclean 
Hands" 
Common law fraud exists when the following elements are proved: 
( 1) a representation of a material fact; (2) the falsity of that representa-
tion; (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so reckless as 
to the consequences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent (scien-
ter); ( 4) justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation by the party 
deceived which induces him to act thereon; and (5) injury to the party 
deceived as a result of his reliance on the misrepresentation. 13 The first 
patent legislation in the United States, the Patent Act of 1790, allowed 
individuals to sue for cancellation of a fraudulently procured patent. 14 
However, this private right of action was removed from the statute by 
the Patent Act of 1836. 1 ~ From that time until 1933, only suits by the 
government to cancel a fraudulently procured patent were recognized. 16 
In 1933, the Supreme Court, in Keystone Driller Co. v. General 
Excavator Co., 17 allowed equitable relief to a private individual de-
fendant in a patent infringement action based on a fraudulently pro-
cured patent. The Court's reasoning incorporated the equitable doctrine 
of "unclean hands," which forbids equitable relief to one who has acted 
in bad faith. 18 This doctrine originally developed in the English courts 
of chancery and paralleled the development of the doctrine of fraud in 
the common law courts. 19 The standard of conduct necessary to secure 
a remedy under each of the doctrines is essentially the same.20 
In 1945, the U.S. Supreme Court established fraud in patent pro-
13. W. Kt:t:TON, D. DoBBS, R. Kt:t:TON & D. OwEN, PRossER AND KEETON oN ToRTS§§ 
100-05 (5th ed. 1984); 37 C.JS. Fraud § 3 (1943) 
14. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111. This provision was also carried forth in 
the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323. 
15. See Patent Art of 1836, ch. 357, § 16, 5 Stat. 117, 123. See also Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 797 (1870)("[T]he intention of Congress [was] not to allow a patent to be 
abrogated in any collateral proceeding . .") 
16. See, e.g., Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1871)(action to cancel a patent by 
private individual denied even though patent was procured by means of a fraud); United States v. 
American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)( government has a "duty to correct this evil, to 
recall these patents, to get a remedy for this fraud .... "). 
17. 2'!0 us 240 (1933) 
18. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 940 (1979). 
19. Ram, Patent Fraud: A New Defense?, 54 J PAT. OFF. Soc'v 363, 365 (1972). 
20. /d. at 365-66. 
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curement as a defense to charges of patent infringement. 21 This defense 
was not used extensively, however, until 1965, when the Supreme 
Court, in Walker Process Equipment, Inc v. Food Machinery & Chem-
ical Corp., 22 held that a patent procured by fraud was an illegal mo-
nopoly that could be the basis of an antitrust action under section two 
of the Sherman Act. 23 
The analyses of early cases examining the duty of disclosure to the 
PTO merged common law fraud and the equitable doctrine of unclean 
hands. 24 The pioneer case discussing these issues was Norton v. Cur-
tiss. 211 In Norton, the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals affirmed a 
decision of the Commissioner refusing to strike an application under 
the then applicable version of PTO Rule 56.26 The court based its 
analysis upon the five element common law fraud standard.27 The 
court then modified certain of those elements to fit the patent law con-
text, merging the doctrines of fraud and unclean hands. 28 It concluded 
that "[a] court might still evade the evidence in light of the traditional 
elements of technical fraud, but will now include a broader range of 
21. Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). 
22. 382 U.S. 172 (1965). 
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). 
24. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623 
(C.C.P.A. 1975). Such a duty exists because of the ex parte nature of patent prosecution and the 
public interest in ensuring that only valid patents issue. 
25. 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
26. 35 C.F.R. § 1.56 ( 1970). The rule at that time provided: 
56. Improper applications. Any application signed or sworn to in blank, or without 
actual inspection by the applicant, and any application altered or partly filled in after 
being signed or sworn to, and also any application fraudulently filed or in connection 
with which any fraud is practiced or attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken 
from the files. 
!d. (emphasis added). 
27. 433 F.2d at 793. The court first noted that "traditionally, the concept of fraud has most 
often been used by the courts, in general, to refer to a type of conduct so reprehensible that it 
could alone form the basis of an actionable wrong . . ." !d. at 792. 
28. /d. at 793. The court explained: 
But the term "fraud" is also commonly used to define that conduct which may be raiser\ 
as a defense in an action at equity for enforcement of a specific obligation. In this 
context, it is evident that the concept takes on a whole new scope. However, in 
these situations, failure, for one reason or another, to satisfy all the elements of the 
technical offense often will not necessarily result in a holding of "no fraud." Rather the 
courts appear to look at the equities of the particular case and determine whether the 
conduct before them--which might have been admittedly less than fraudulent in the 
technical sense-was still so reprehensible as to justify the court's refusing to enforce 
the rights of the party guilty of such conduct. It might be said that in such instances 
the concept of fraud becomes intermingled with the equitable conduct of "unclean 
hands." 
/d. (emphasis added.) 
The elements of common law fraud modified by the court included materiality, intent, and 
injury. /d. at 794-96. 
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conduct within each of those elements, giving consideration to the equi-
ties involved in the particular case."29 Thus, the court relaxed the fraud 
requirement actions dealing with patent procurement. However, the 
court retained the rigid intent element of fraud, explaining that "[ t ]he 
state of mind of the one making the representations is probably the 
most important of the elements to be considered in determining the ex-
istence of fraud." 30 
Even though the Norton decision merged the doctrines of unclean 
hands and fraud to achieve a more workable fraud standard of proof 
for patent cases, there were numerous conflicts regarding the intent re-
quirement and the duty to disclose. 31 Many courts had held that the 
inequitable conduct defense required both knowledge and intent to con-
ceal.32 Other courts had held that a patent may be invalid regardless of 
this intent. 33 In 1977, the PTO attempted to resolve these conflicts by 
promulgating rules based on existing office policy regarding fraud and 
inequitable conduct, which the PTO found consistent with the then 
prevailing case law in the federal courts. 34 Rule 1.56 made punishable 
both affirmative misrepresentations311 and "material" omissions36 in 
patent procurement. It was felt that Rule 1.56 would have a stabilizing 
effect on future decisions and that it would also offer guidance to the 
29. !d. 
30. !d. at 795. 
31. See Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 AIPLA Q.J. 227, 233 (1982). 
32. See, e.g, Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 433 F.2d 1034 (2nd Cir. 
1970); Benger Laboratories, Ltd. v. R.K. Laros, Co., 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 
375 U.S. 833. 
33. See, e.g., Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 488 F.2d 382 (1st. Cir. 1973); 
Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 550 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1977). 
34. See Duty of Disclosure; Striking of Applications, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (a), (d) (1978), which 
provides: 
!d. 
(a) A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests on 
the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application, and 
on every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecu-
tion of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or 
with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application. All such individu-
als have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of which is material 
to the examination of the application. Such information is material where there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in decid-
ing whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty is commensurate 
with the degree of involvement in the preparation of prosecution or the application . 
• • • 
(d) An application shall be stricken from the files if it is established by clear and con-
vincing evidence that any fraud was practiced or attempted on the Office in connection 
with the application, or in connection with it or that there was any violation of the duty 
of disclosure through bad faith or gross negligence. 
35. See id. § 1.56(d). 
36. See id. § 1.56(a) 
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courts. 37 However, the rule did not stabilize the standard for proving 
inequitable conduct, and the wording of the rule has been widely criti-
cized for vagueness. 38 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit faced the challenge of clarifying patent laws and resolving conflicts 
between courts, and between the courts and the PTO. 
B. The Establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was formed in 1982 
by merging the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of 
Claims. Congress established the CAFC as a court with exclusive ap-
pellate jurisdiction over all patent cases on appeal from the federal dis-
trict courts. 39 It was expected that uniformity and reliability in the in-
terpretation and application of patent law would result, and that forum 
shopping among the circuits would cease.'0 While the CAFC has estab-
lished uniformity in many areas of patent law, it has not yet reached a 
consensus as to the bounds and parameters of prohibited conduct before 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office concerning both ex 
parte and inter partes matters.41 For this reason, until recently the 
standard of proof for inequitable conduct, especially with respect to the 
intent element, remained an area of enormous uncertainty to attorney 
and client alike. The most recent CAFC decisions involving inequitable 
conduct have done much to dispel this uncertainty.'2 
37. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 
2010 (Rev. 3, May 1986). 
38. See Proposed Resolution 403-1 on Duty of Disclosure, ABA SEc. PAT., TRADEMARK & 
CoPYRIGHT L. CoMM. REP., 252, 253 (1988); Resolution 502-1 on Duty of Disclosure, ABA 
SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT L. CoMM. REP., 67, 68 (1987); Adamo & Ducatman, 
The Status of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct Before the Office: "Violation of the Duty of Dis-
closure" Out of "Inequitable Conduct" by "Fraud", 68 ]. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 193, 205 n.l4 
(1986). 
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982). When jurisdiction in the district court rested wholly or in part 
on the patent portion of 28 U.S.C 1338 (1982), or on certain subsections of 28 U.S.C. 1346 (1982) 
not relating to taxes, the judgements in those cases are appealable exclusively to the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction over appeals from the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1985). However, after an adverse 
decision from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the dissatisfied applicant may alter-
natively sue the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia; the decision must thereafter be appealed to the Federal Circuit. 35 
U.S.C. § 145 (1982) 
40. S. Rt:P. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in, 1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS II, 14. 
41. The reason for this lack of consensus is not due to the infrequency of addressing the issue 
of inequitable conduct. The CAFC has addressed inequitable conduct extensively. See infra table 
accompanying notes 91 to 102. 
42. See generally infra text accompanying notes 61 to 111. 
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C. Application of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine in the CAFC 
In its early decisions, the CAFC adopted the modified five element 
prima facie standard of inequitable conduct articulated in Norton v. 
Curtiss. 43 In Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 44 the court further delineated 
the standard: 
Fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and the party 
asserting it carries a heavy burden .... The intent element of fraud, 
however, may be proven by a showing of acts the natural conse-
quences of which are presumably intended by the actor. Statements 
made with gross negligence as to their truth may establish such in-
tent . ... The duty of candor owed the PTO being uncompromising, it 
would deal a deathblow to that duty if direct proof of wrongful intent 
were required. At the same time, that something thought to be true 
when stated, or a piece of prior art thought unimportant to the PTO's 
decision, was later determined to have been untrue or important, will 
not automatically and alone establish that fraud or inequitable con-
duct occurred. 
* * * 
Where one who knew, or should have known, that a piece of prior 
art, or other information, would be material, i.e., important to the 
PTO in making its decision, a failure to disclose that art or informa-
tion can be sufficient proof that a wrongful intent exi~ted to mislead 
the PTO, and may result in a finding of what has come to be called 
"fraud" on the PTO!~ 
The court did not deviate from this standard until early 1984, in 
the case of American Hoist & Derrick v. Sowa & Sons, Inc. 46 Judge 
Rich abandoned the Norton v. Curtiss standard and announced a bal-
ancing test comprising the elements of materiality and intent. The court 
stated that the jury must first decide whether the level of intent is con-
vincing. Next, the court will balance intent in light of materiality to 
determine, as a matter of law, whether fraud on the PTO occurred.47 
43. See, e.g., Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Orthope-
dic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
44. 719 F.2d 1144 (Fed Cir. 1983). 
45. /d. at 1151-52 (emphasis added). 
46. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984). 
47. /d. at 1363-64. The court stated: 
The jury must also determine how convincing has been the proof of intent, if at all. It 
should, therefore, be instructed that it may find a showing on this element to be lacking 
entirely or that it may find intent to have been shown by any relevant degree of 
proof-from inference to direct evidence, i.e., from gross negligence or recklessness to a 
deliberate scheming. 
The considerations here are distinct from fraud as a common law cause of action. In 
the latter instance, it is usual that a jury can render a verdict for plaintiff by answering 
affirmatively the factual questions of (I) knowing (2) misrepresentation or omission (3) 
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The following graph more clearly represents the American Hoist bal-
ancmg process: 
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The vertical axis shows the range of intent and the horizontal axis 
shows the range of materiality. First, the trier of fact must determine 
whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that the defendant's 
conduct reaches the threshold levels of materiality and intent. 48 If both 
of a material ("important" or "inducing") fact, (4) intent, and (5) reliance by the party 
deceived (6) to his damage. It need only answer "yes" to these fact questions to find 
fraud. 
Here, however, because an applicant's misrepresentation or failure to meet his "duty to 
disclose to the Office information which is material" will not in itself render a 
patent invalid or unenforceable, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) and (d), "fraud" may be de-
termined only by a careful balancing of intent in light of materiality. The result of 
that balancing is obviously not a fact that may be found to exist or not, nor is it a mere 
matter of application of the law to the facts, both normal jury functions. It requires that 
judicial discretion be brought to bear, and the district court shall decide it. 
/d. (emphasis added). 
Confirmation that the Norton standard no longer ruled in the Federal Circuit came in Dris-
coll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884-85 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(proof of reliance was not an element of 
"fraud on the Patent Office"). 
48. The American Hoist Court found the threshold level of materiality to be misconduct 
which "might reasonably have affected the examiner's decision as to patentability." American 
Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1362. This interpretation of materiality is similar to PTO Rule 56(a), which 
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thresholds are satisfied, then the court will decide, as a matter of law, 
whether inequitable conduct occurred in light of materiality and intent. 
A lessor degree of materiality requires a greater degree of intent. In 
contrast, a lessor degree of intent is required where the information has 
a great degree of materiality. 49 In essence, the summation of materiality 
and intent is used so that a large amount of one and a small amount of 
the other equal a sum which exceeds what may be considered the ineq-
uitable conduct boundary.60 
The balancing test has been used by the CAFC since American 
Hoist, and is still alive today.~ 1 The American Hoist test has been criti-
provides that information "is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a 
patent." 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a). This standard has also been applied in subsequent cases. See, e.g., 
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 
U.S. 822 (1985); FMC v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Note that 
application of this standard has not been absolute. See, e.g., Carella v. Starlight Archery, 804 F.2d 
135 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(information not material unless there is a clear showing that prior art would 
impact the determination of obviousness); Rolls Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101 
(Fed. Cir. 1986)(without looking for any other threshold for materiality the court found that a 
"merely cumulative" reference is not material). 
The American Hoist court implied that threshold level of intent would at least be gross negli-
gence. This threshold level of intent dropped to a simple negligence standard in subsequent cases 
and, more recently, has been raised to something close to an actual intent to deceive. See infra text 
accompanying notes 61 to 64. 
The CAFC did not formally announce "threshold" levels as part of its analysis until J.P. 
Stevens. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559. However, threshold levels of intent and materiality were 
present in American Hoist and continue today. Cf. Wegner, Inequitable Conduct and the Proper 
Roles of Patent Attorney and Examiner in an Era of International Patent Harmonizatiort, 16 
AlP LA Q.J. 38, 62 ( 1988)(declaring that the CAFC's holding in Manitowoc abandons th'e bal-
ancing test and replaces it with a rebuttable three-element test). 
It is also significant to note that the standards for both materiality and intent continue to be 
criticized and recently several proposals to change rule 56 were made. Patent and Trademark 
Office Proposals to Modify Rules 56 and 97-99, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 96 (1988). Efforts to,modify 
Rule 56 were finally abandoned in October 1988, when the PTO decided that it would no longer 
investigate patent applications for inequitable conduct under Rule 56. See infra notes 102 to 106. 
49. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1455 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)("wrongful intent may lower the materiality requirement."). In a way this is not really a 
balancing test. Materiality and intent are not balanced against each other but rather weighed 
together; it is clear that inequitable conduct may be found when both materiality and intent exist 
in a high degree. See, e.g., In Re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The "balancing test" 
seems simply to reserve the ultimate judgment to the courts. 
50. This boundary is determined by the courts using their sense of equity. See American 
Hoist, 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984)("1t requires that judicial discretion be brought to 
bear . ."). 
51. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorf£ Licensing, Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hycor Corp. v. 
Schlueter Co., 7 40 F.2d 1529, 1537-41 (Fed. Cir. 1984 ); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laborato-
ries, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 1376, 1376 (D.N.J. 1988); H. B. Fuller Co. v. National Starch and Chern. 
Corp., 689 F.Supp. 923, 932-34 (D. Minn. 1988); Edwards v. Weinburger, 688 F. Supp. 203, 
217 (E.D. Vir. 1988). 
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cized by some commentators because its parameters and application 
vary greatly from case to case. 112 It is easy to establish a standard using 
the important elements that must be considered; it is much more diffi-
cult to get that test to fit all situations involving inequitable conduct. 
However, even wide variances in the test's application seem consistent 
with Judge Rich's requirement that "judicial discretion be brought to 
bear .... " 113 By balancing materiality and intent the courts are allowed 
more discretion, which is proper for courts deciding cases which turn 
on equitable principles. 114 
D. The Demise of Intent as an Element of Inequitable Conduct 
Inequitable conduct, unlike fraud, does not require a showing of 
bad faith as part of the "intent" element. 1111 The intent element of ineq-
uitable conduct has been satisfied by a showing of "gross negligence," 
which the CAFC defines as the failure to act as a "reasonable person," 
one who should have known of the materiality of a withheld refer-
ence.116 For example, a reasonable person should know that "impor-
tant" prior art should be disclosed. Therefore, the intent element is sat-
isfied by merely showing that the omitted prior art was important. 117 
52. See, e.g, Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability 
Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AlP LA Q.J. 7, 12 ( 1988). To see just how varying the appli-
cation of the American Hoist test can be, see KangaROOS U.S.A., lnr. v. Caldor Inc., 778 F.2d 
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Haworth, Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., 685 F. Supp 1422 (W.D. Mich. 1988). 
53. American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1364. 
54. For a discussion of the incorporation of these equitable principles into the inequitable 
conduct defense, see supra notes 24 to 31 and accompanying text. 
55. Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
56. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court held 
that "[p]roof of deliberate scheming is not needed; gross negligence is sufficient. Gross negligence 
is present when the actor, judged as a reasonable person in his position, should have known of the 
materiality of the withheld reference. On the other hand, simple negligence, oversight, or an erro-
neous judgment made in good faith, is insufficient. /d. at 1560 (citations omitted). It is interesting 
to note that even though the court specifically stated that simple negligence was not enough to 
constitute inequitable conduct, its definition of gross negligence seemed to include simple negli-
gence. Negligence is commonly understood to mean failure to act as a reasonable person would 
have acted in the same or similar circumstances. Gross negligence, on the other hand, is great 
negligence, that requires willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or evidence of utter lack of all 
care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965); 57 AM. jt:R. 2D ]'v'egfigence § 99 
(1971); 65 C.J.S. Negligence§ 8(4)(1966); W. KEETON, D. DoRRS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 34 (5th ed. 1984 ). See also Machinery Corp 
of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(court stated with respect to gross 
negligence that, "The gross negligence standard has been defined as requiring willful, wanton, or 
reckless misconduct, or evidence of 'utter lack of all care.'"); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 
F.2d 1529, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
57. Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Even·oat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 
1985)(court found the requisite intent to establish inequitable conduct because Argus's attorney 
should have known the importance of the withheld information). More recently the CAFC has 
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The relaxing of the intent requirement to a mere showing of gross 
negligence has caused inequitable conduct to become a popular de-
fense.118 The CAFC has often been willing to find inequitable conduct 
where the district court had rejected the defense. From the 1982 incep-
tion of the CAFC through 1988, the court wrote twelve opinions in 
favor of the accused infringer on the issue of inequitable conduct. Eight 
of those decisions were reversals of the district court's finding that ineq-
uitable conduct did not exist, and four affirmed the district court's find-
ings of inequitable conduct.119 
Inequitable conduct, a charge that challenges the integrity of the 
patentee and his attorney, would seem to be an area of law similar to 
fraud where an appellate court gives more deference to the rulings of 
the District Court as compared to other non-fraud issues. But until 
recently, the opposite has been true. 60 
Not only has the number of inequitable conduct claims increased 
in recent years, but additionally the focus of trials involving inequitable 
conduct issues has switched from trials primarily concerned with the 
abandoned this approach. Cf Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1095 
(Fed. Cir. 1987)(good faith belief that certain prior art was not material is sufficient to overcome a 
charge of inequitable conduct). 
58. This popularity stems directly from the lowered intent standard, since historically the 
intent requirement in a fraud defense had been one of the elements most difficult to prove. The 
relaxed standard has prompted commentators to urge CAFC practitioners to liberally use the 
inequitable conduct defense. See generally Schwab, Defending a Patent Case Under the Watchful 
t.ye of the Federal Circuit, 70 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 100 (1988). 
59. See infra chart accompanying notes 91 to 102. 
60. One author has published staggering numbers. He says that the reversal rate on decisions 
favoring the alleged infringers involving inequitable conduct is SOo/o and that in decisions not in-
volving inequitable conduct, the reversal rate is less than 10%. See Schwab, 70 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 
at 105, 108. Another author suggests more conservative numbers. He wrote: 
[A]n examination of the Federal Circuit rulings on inequitable conduct issues shows 
that, in the overwhelming majority of such cases, no inequitable conduct was found. 
The trial court's finding of no inequitable conduct was upheld in twenty-one cases and 
reversed only four times. A lower court finding of inequitable conduct is generally only 
found where, 'but for' the withholding of the information, the claims in issue would 
clearly not have issued or where there is very strong non-circumstantial evidence of a 
deliberate intent to deceive. 
Pearson, How To Keep Your Hands Clean - The Developing U.S. Law On Inequitable Conduct 
In Patent Prosecution, 92 lNTELL PROP. J. 91, 99-100 (1987). The CAFC has recently resolved, 
in an en bane decision, that "inequitable conduct is committed to the discretion of the trial court 
and is reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard." Kingstown Medical Consul-
tants v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This resolution will ultimately reduce 
these reversal rates on inequitable conduct issues. 
Assuming that the 10% reversal rate suggested by Mr. Schwab is correct, the more conserva-
tive numbers show that reversal rates involving inequitable conduct issues are double non-inequi-
table conduct issues. For an independent analysis in the CAFC's reversal rate on inequitable 
conduct, see infra text accompanying notes 91 to 102. Based on these numbers, it is not difficult to 
understand why so many inequitable conduct charges are raised. 
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merits of an invention to trials primarily concerned with the ethics or 
morals of those involved in prosecuting the patent. 61 As a result, many 
courts have emphasized discouraging dishonest conduct in dealing with 
the PTO, but at the expense of encouraging invention and dissemina-
tion to the public, the primary purposes of the patent system.62 To es-
tablish a standard that encourages litigation and deflects the attention 
of the court away from the merits of an invention, the primary pur-
poses of the patent system are unnecessarily compromised.63 
II. THE IMPACT OF RECENT CAFC DECISIONS ON THE ELEMENT 
OF INTENT 
A. The Return of Intent as One of the Two Elements zn a Prima 
Facie "Violation of Duty" Case 
In two recent decisions, the CAFC again began to require a 
greater showing of intent to mislead before finding that inequitable 
conduct occurred. In both FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 64 and In re 
Harita, 66 the CAFC modified the intent threshold by raising the re-
quired level of proof of intent to mislead the PTO from gross negli-
gence to an actual intent to mislead. 66 These decisions will have a long-
lasting effect on the manner in which the PTO deals with inequitable 
conduct. Perhaps more importantly, the decisions reflect a concern 
noted by many judges that the inequitable conduct defense is overused, 
wastes resources, and frustrates the primary purposes of the patent 
61. See generally, Chism, Patent Law and the Presumption of Moral Regularity: A Critical 
Review of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Inequitable Conduct and Willful infringement, J. 
PAT OFF. Soc'v 27 (1987). 
62. The CAFC has, in some cases, been aware of this overemphasis and their decisions re-
flect a desire to reduce it. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571 
(Fed Cir. 1983) which said: 
Surely a very important policy consideration is to disclose all manner of dishonest con-
duct in dealing with the PTO. At the same time, the basic policy underlying the patent 
system is to encourage the disclosure of inventions through issuance of patents. Another 
policy of the system is to stimulate the investment of risk capital in the commercializa-
tion of useful patentable inventions so that the public gets some benefit from them, 
which may not occur in the absence of some patent protection. Clearly, we are faced 
with questions of both socioeconomic policy on the one hand, and morals or ethics on 
the other. We think we should not so emphasize either category as to forget the other. 
ld. (emphasis added) 
63. It is the author's contention that these policies are not mutually exclusive; that a standard 
for inequitable conduct exists which will allow discouragement of fraud in the PTO while encour-
aging disclosure of inventions. 
64. 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
65. 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
66. One other case that fits into this category is FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 
F.2d 521 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In Hennessy, the CAFC held that the non-disclosure of facts of facts of 
an "on sale" wds not sufficient to satisfy the inequitable conduct defense. 
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system.67 
1. FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co. 
a. Background. FMC filed suit against Manitowoc for a declara-
tory judgment that its heavy lift cranes did not infringe Manitowoc's 
patent and that Manitowoc's patent was invalid.68 FMC also alleged 
that Manitowoc's threatened enforcement of the patent constituted un-
fair competition because "FMC was forced to 'design around' [a] pat-
ent procured through inequitable conduct."69 The charge that alleged 
the patentee had not disclosed information that constituted prior art 
publication. At trial, the patent owner presented evidence that he did 
not believe that the information in question constituted art that re-
quired disclosure. Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the 
patentee lacked intent to mislead the PT0.70 
b. The CAFC' s reasoning. Chief Judge Markey devoted most of 
his opinion to the issue of inequitable conduct and ultimately estab-
lished when the invocation of an inequitable conduct claim is proper. 
The court stated that: 
"Inequitable conduct" is not, or should not be, a magic incantation to 
67. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp. 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
The Dayco court noted: 
We add one final word: the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major 
patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled 
to make the charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to re-
present their client's interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere with the accusa-
tion in but a small percentage of the cases, but such charges are not inconsequential on 
that account. They destroy the respect for one another's integrity, for being fellow 
members of an honorable profession, that used to make the bar a valuable help to the 
courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and to sustain the good name of the 
bar itself. A patent litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported 
charge of "inequitable conduct in the Patent Office" is a negative contribution to the 
rightful administration of justice. The charge was formerly known as "fraud on the 
Patent Office," a more pejorative term, but the change of name does not make the thing 
itself smell any sweeter. Even after complete testimony the court should find inequita-
ble conduct only if shown by clear and convincing evidence. A summary judgment that 
a reputable attorney has been guilty of inequitable conduct, over his denials, ought to 
be, and can properly be, rare indeed. 
/d. See also Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)(" 'Fraud in the PTO' has been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is 
cluttering up the patent system."). 
68. Manitowoc, 835 F.2d at 1412. The challenged patent was U.S. Patent No. 3,485,383 
('383) 
69. Manitowoc responded by initiating a separate suit against FMC for infringement, and 
FMC counterclaimed for antitrust violations. The cases were consolidated in this action, but the 
only issue discussed here is the inequitable conduct claim. 
70. /d. at 1415. 
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be asserted against every patentee. Nor is that allegation established 
upon a mere showing that art or information having some degree of 
materiality was not disclosed. To be guilty of inequitable conduct, one 
must have intended to act inequitably. Thus, one who alleges a "fail-
ure to disclose" form of inequitable conduct must offer clear and con-
vincing proof of: (1) prior art or information that is material; (2) 
knowledge chargeable to applicant of that prior art or information 
and of its materiality; and (3) failure of the applicant to disclose the 
art or information resulting from an intent to mislead the PT0.71 
Judge Markey explained that this proof may be rebutted by a 
good faith showing that the applicant's failure to disclose art or infor-
mation did not result from an intent to mislead the PT0.72 The court 
applied the American Hoist balancing test, but added an interesting 
twist; it held that "[ t]he level of materiality may be high or low ... ", 
but the "[a]pplicant must be chargeable with knowledge of the exis-
tence of the prior art or information, for it is impossible to disclose the 
unknown."73 The court further weakened the gross negligence standard 
by stating that 
an applicant who knew or should have known of the art or informa-
tion, and of its materiality, is not automatically precluded thereby 
from an effort to convince the fact finder that the failure to disclose 
was nonetheless not due to an intent to mislead the PTO; i.e., that, in 
light of all the circumstances of the case, an inference of intent to 
mislead is not warranted.74 
The court strengthened the notion that subjective good faith will 
cure a suspected inequitable conduct charge. 711 In essence, it established 
/d. 
71. !d. 
72. /d. The court stated that: 
That proof may be rebutted by a showing that: (a) the prior art or information was not 
material (e.g. because it is less pertinent than or merely cumulative with prior art or 
information cited to or by the PTO); (b) if the prior art or information was material, a 
showing that applicant did not know of that art or information; (c) if applicant did 
know of that art or information, a showing that applicant did not know of its material-
ity; (d) a showing that applicant's failure to disclose art or information did not result 
from an intent to mislead the PTO. 
73. /d. 
74. /d. at 1416. 
7 5. The court reasoned that: 
No single factor or combination of factors can be said always to require an inference of 
intent to mislead; yet a patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it 
knew or should have known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to estab-
lish "subjective good faith" sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to 
mislead. A mere denial of intent to mislead (which would defeat every effort to estab-
lish inequitable conduct) will not suffice in such circumstances. Nonetheless, when, as 
here, the district court finds, on all the evidence, that an applicant had no knowledge of 
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that once it is shown the applicant should have known of the material-
ity of certain information, the burden of proof as to intent to mislead 
the PTO shifts to the applicant. The applicant may then successfully 
challenge the claim by showing that he acted in good faith with no 
knowledge of the art's materiality. 
2. In Re Harita 
a. Background. Mr. Harita and five other employees of Kissei 
Pharmaceutical Co., a Japanese company, are the inventors listed for a 
patent issued in 1976.76 The patent was filed by an American patent 
attorney on behalf of Kissei's patent attorney, Mr. Agata. Mr. Agata 
later received notice of an action by the French patent office which 
cited a reference77 that disclosed compounds within the scope of the 
claims of the U.S. application. He notified Kissei, which made a fur-
ther search and found other prior art on which the U.S. claims relied. 
When Kissei asked Mr. Agata whether the additional prior art should 
be called to the attention of the United States PTO, he replied that it 
should not. 78 After the patent issued, Kissei learned that Mr. Agata's 
advice had been wrong. They took steps to file a reissue application 
through new U.S. attorneys. 79 
In 1979, the pending reissue application was referred to the spe-
cial program examiner at the PTO. After four and a half years of addi-
tional investigation, the program examiner rejected certain of the claims 
on the sole ground that Mr. Agata did not disclose the newly discovered 
art to the PTO before the patent issued. He based his decision on PTO 
Rule 1.56(d).80 
Harita appealed the special program examiner's finding of inequi-
table conduct to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which 
/d. 
materiality, that that lack of knowledge was not due to gross negligence, and that appli-
cant had no intent to mislead the PTO, the burden on an appellant attempting to 
overturn those findings is not met by mere argument that undisclosed art or informa-
tion known to the applicant was material. 
76. In re Harita 847 F.2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The patent claimed "a group of com-
pounds useful for treating asthma, hay fever, etc." /d. 
77. /d. (citing CHEMICAL ABSTRACTS Vol. 71 No 3354V (1969). 
78. Harita, 847 F.2d at 804. 
79. /d. at 805. The ground for reissue was that the patent was "inoperative", within the 
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1982), to protect the invention "by reason of the patentee claiming 
more ... than he had a right to claim in the patent". 
80. /d. at 806. Rule 56(d) provides that "an application shall be stricken from the record if it 
is established by clear and convincing evidence that any fraud was practiced or attempted on the 
Office in connection with it or that there was any violation of the duty of disclosure through bad 
faith or gross negligence." 37 C.F.R § 1.56(d) (1977). 
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affirmed the finding by simply adopting and attaching the examiner's 
brief to it's short opinion.81 Harita then appealed to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
b. The CAFC's reasoning. The CAFC emphasized that its deci-
sion was fact specific and that the standard of inequitable conduct that 
should be applied is the standard existing at the time the original pat-
ent issued. 82 The court stated that the only issue in this case is whether 
the PTO established that the Japanese attorney, Mr. Agata, had an 
intent to mislead the PTO. The Court concluded that although the 
Board found that Mr. Agata had been grossly negligent in his failure to 
report the prior art to the PTO, such a vague concept should not, with-
out more, imply an intent to mislead. It reversed the prior decisions of 
the PTO because, in its view, an intent to mislead had not been ade-
quately proved.83 Judge Rich stated, "[w]e think we should not infer 
merely from some vague thing called 'gross negligence' an intent which 
it was the PTO's obligation to establish and especially that we should 
not infer it in light of detailed rules of procedure enacted long after the 
events in this case took place."84 In making these conclusions, it re-
ferred to the court's previous decision in FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc. 85 
The court also found that for Mr. Agata to be guilty of inequitable 
conduct, he must have intended to act inequitably.86 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Davis stated that Mr. Agata was 
guilty of at least gross negligence and therefore inequitable conduct. 
The American patent attorney prosecuting the original patent applica-
tion before the PTO wrote two letters to the Japanese attorney, "each 
cautioning that a newly-found (but prior) disclosure of a compound 
within the scope of the application's claims would invalidate those 
claims."87 Such material claims became known to Mr. Harita, but he 
told the inventors that it was not necessary to call that prior art to the 
attention of the PTO. He also knew that a voluntary amendment (cor-
recting a claim that had been too broadly or inartfully drafted) was 
permissible in the U.S. patent practice. 
81 See Fx Parte Harita, 1 USPQ 2d 1887 (U.S. Pat. Off. 1987); Harita, 847 F.2d at 803. 
82. /d. at 807. The court stated that its decision was made "with no intent whatsoever to 
create a precedent applicable to different fact situations." Although setting precedent was not the 
intention of the court, the case created a strong precedent, as evidenced by the PTO's attention to 
Harita. See infra text accompanying notes 106-111. 
83. !d. at 808. 
84. !d. at 809. 
85. 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See supra, notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
86. The court based this conclusion on the language in Manitowoc, !d. at 1415. (" 'Inequita-
ble conduct' is not . some magic incantation to be asserted against every patentee .... To be 
guilty of inequitable conduct, one must have intended to act inequitably''). 
87. Harita, 847 F.2d. at 810. 
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To Judge Davis, Mr. Agata's conduct amounted to gross negli-
gence, "at the very least."88 He stated that " '[g]ross negligence' is one 
form of inequitable conduct specified in the July 1982 Patent rule em-
bodied in 37 C.F.R § 1.56(d), and this court has accepted that founda-
tion for showing the proper measure of intent, especially where, as 
here, there is a high level of materiality."89 By balancing materiality 
and intent, both of which he found to exist in high measures, Judge 
Davis concluded that inequitable conduct occurred when Mr. Agata 
failed to disclose the reference. 90 
B. The Effect of FMC and Harita 
Both FMC and Harita require the party alleging inequitable con-
duct to bring forth evidence that proves an actual intent to mislead the 
PTO. This approach raises the required threshold level of intent from 
the gross negligence standard to proof nearer an actual intent to 
deceive. 91 The immediate effect of these decisions will be to substan-
tially increase the burden on those charging a patentee with fraud. The 
long-term effect will be litigation that is more consistent with the pur-
poses of the patent system.92 
Based purely on statistics, the CAFC has not been hospitable to 
inequitable conduct charges.93 (See the table below.)94 
88. !d. 
89. !d. Judge Davis also explained that in 1975-76 the basis for finding inequitable conduct 
included gross negligence, and that precedent suggests that the later versions of Rule 56 generally 
embody the PTO policy as it earlier existed. See In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623. 627 (C.C.P.A. 1975); 
Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (1984) 
Judge Davis' dissent is persuasive in that it followed CAFC precedent, absent the FMC 
decision. The CAFC adopted the precedents of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and 
indicated that it would not overrule applicable precedents except by en bane consideration. South 
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982)(en bane). Both FMC and 
Harita were decided by three-judge panels. However, the en bane decision affirming these inequi-
table conduct decisions in Harita and FMC was not long in coming. In Kingstown Medical Con-
sultant v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court in a separate part of the 
decision made a "Resolution of Conflicting Precedent" and held that " 'gross negligence' does not 
of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the 
evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require 
a finding of intent to deceive." !d. at 876. 
90. Harita, 847 F.2d at 811 (citing In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
91. By referring to the graph, see supra text accompanying notes 47-50, one can see that 
this effectively reduces the area, i.e. the number of inequitable conduct cases, in which the CAFC 
will find inequitable conduct. 
92. For the practical effects of Harita and Manitowoc, see infra text accompanying notes 
108-111. 
93. Statistics, however, do not tell the full story. For a more meaningful analysis, one must 
make a qualitative, not merely a quantitative analysis. This comment shows that the threshold 
level of intent has increased from what may be considered a 'simple negligence' standard to some-
where near an 'actual intent to mislead' standard. This substantively demonstrates that the CAFC 
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CAFC Decisions on Inequitable Conduct 
Where Lower Court or Agency 
Found Inequitable Conduct 
Since 1982 (Beginning of 
CAFC): 
1988: 
Inequitable Conduct Issue 
Raised But Lower Court or 
Agency Rejected 
Since 1982 (Beginning of 
CAFC): 
1988: 
TOTAL 
Number of Cases 
involving Inequitable 
Conduct 
18 90 
3 97 
33 99 
8'"' 
51 
is less hospitable to fraud as compared to previous years. 
Number Reversed Percent, % 
By CAFC 
13 96 72 
3 98 100 
7'"" 21 
2102 25 
21 
94. Note that the table only takes into account published opinions through 1988 that address 
inequitable conduct on appeal to the CAFC. Inequitable conduct is alleged in many cases but is 
rejected in most of them. See Dunner, Inequitable Conduct: Is the Sky Falling? 16 AIPLA Q.J. 
27, 28-29 (1988)(lnequitable conduct charges are rejected 75o/o of the time at the district court 
level and 91% of the time at the PTO. 
95. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorf[ Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Gardco Mfg. Inc. v. Herst Lighting 
Co., 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392 (Fed. 
Cir. 1986); In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886 (Fed. Cir. 1986); KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, 
Inc., 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985); State Indus., Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 769 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 
Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 760 F.2d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Litton Indus. 
Prod., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In reMark Indus., 751 F.2d 
1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984); American Hoist & Derrick 
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern 
Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
96. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987); 
Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987); KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, 
Inc., 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985); State Indus., Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 769 F.2d 762 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985); Litton Indus. Prod., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In 
reMark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 
745 F.2d 27 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm & 
Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern Co., 722 F.2d I 556 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
97. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
98. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorf[ Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988); 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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Through 1988, the CAFC has heard appeals on issues concerning 
inequitable conduct in 51 cases. The reversal rate in cases where the 
lower court or agency found inequitable conduct is 72%. In cases where 
the lower court or agency rejected allegations of inequitable conduct, 
the CAFC's reversal rate is only 21%. 103 This indicates that the 
chances of a reversal following a trial court's finding of inequitable con-
duct are significantly greater than reversing a finding of no inequitable 
conduct. 
99. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp. 859 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1988); E.!. Dupont De Nemours 
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed Cir. 1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., 
Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec .. Inc., 847 F.2d 819 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Grain Processing 
Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Allen Organ Co. v. Kim-
ball lnt'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 
521 (Fed. Cir. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Under Sea 
Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Sweats Fashions. Inc. v. Pannill 
Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co., 
832 F.2d 581 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. 
Cir. 1987); Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); NV 
Akzo v. E.!. Dupont de Nemours, 810 F.2d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Carella v. Starlight Archery 
and Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prod. Co., 803 F.2d 676 
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 F.2d 1111 (Fed.· 
Cir. 1986); Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Laitram 
Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 785 F.2d 292 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre 
Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens 
Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 
750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Inc., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984 ); Kahle v. Dart Indus. Inc., 726 F.2d 724 
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v. 
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983); Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Ortho-
pedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
100. A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. (1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason 
Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 
759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613 
(Fed. Cir. 1985); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Inc., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Driscoll v. 
Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern Co., 722 F.2d 1556 
(Fed. Cir. 1983) 
101. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp. 859 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1988); E.!. Dupont De Nemours 
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed Cir. 1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus., 
Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Grain Processing 
Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Allen Organ Co. v. Kim-
ball lnt'l, Inc, 839 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
102. A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason 
Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
103. These reversal rates are high compared to the reversal rates on non-inequitable conduct 
issues suggested by other commentators. See Schwab, supra note 60. 
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The reversal rates in 1988 were not substantially different from 
previous years combined. 104 However, the substance of the reversals in 
the cases of Manitowoc and Harita will have a long lasting effect on 
the application of the inequitable conduct doctrine. 1011 
C. The Effect of FMC and Harita on PTO Policy 
The CAFC decisions in FMC and Harita have had a dramatic 
effect on the PTO's long-standing policy on inequitable conduct. As a 
result of these decisions and suggestions from private sector groups/ 06 
the PTO has decided that it will no longer investigate and reject origi-
nal or reissue patent applications for inequitable conduct under 37 
C.F.R 1.56. 107 This decision was made despite mounting political pres-
sure to codify the infringement defense of inequitable conduct in 37 
C.F.R. 108 The PTO notice states: 
Determination of inequitable conduct issues requires an evaluation of 
the intent of the party involved. While some court decisions have held 
that intent may be inferred in some circumstances, consideration of 
the good faith of the party, or lack thereof, is often required. In sev-
eral recent court decisions a high level of proof of intent to mislead 
the Office was required in order to prove inequitable conduct under 
37 C.F.R. 1.56. Harita; FMC [emphasis added; full citations 
omitted]. 109 
104. This indicates that the decisions, at least in result, have been consistent. 
105. This is evidenced from the PTO's reaction to these cases. See infra text accompanying 
notes I 06-111. 
106. The standards for judging inequitable conduct before the PTO dominated the business 
session of the American Bar Association's Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law at the 
ABA 's annual meeting in Toronto in August, 1988. Among the resolutions passed by the Section 
was one favoring deference, by the PTO, to the federal courts in "all determinations, except in 
disciplinary proceedings, of whether there has been a violation of any duty of disclosure estab-
lished in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1 " Proposed Resolution 403-1 on 
Duty of Disclosure, ABA SEc. PAT., TRADEMARK & CoPYRI(;HT L. CoMM. REP., 252, 253 
(19fl8) 
107. See United States Patent Office, OFF. GAz. (October 11, 1988). 
I 08. See House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Ad-
ministration of Justice, testimony heard on HR 4086 (May 1988). 
109. See Cnited States Patent Office, Off. Gaz. (Ortober 11, 1988). The office does not han-
dle live testimony or participation by adverse parties, as the court can. The courts are also in a 
better position to fashion equitable remedies. 
The PTO, on March 17, 1989, proposed a new rule 57 to replace rule 5(, on the duty of 
disclosure. It includes a "but for" standard of materiality, specific deadlines for submitting 
mandatory disclosure statements, and a fee of $200 for disclosure statements filed more than three 
months, with some exceptions, after the applicable date. Additionally, the new rule provides that 
the PTO will make no evaluation of compliance with the duty of disclosure except in reissue 
applications and disciplinary proceedings. For a more detailed summary of the new rule 57 
ramifications, see Duty of Disclosure and Practitioner Misconduct, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,334 ( 1989) (to 
be codified in 37 C.F.R.)(proposed March 17, 1989). 
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Because of the evaluation necessary to decide an inequitable con-
duct issue, the PTO added, "[ t ]he Office is not the best forum in which 
to determine whether there was an 'intent to mislead.' " 110 It explained 
that the PTO would no longer examine or comment on inequitable 
conduct issues. The PTO replaced the present 37 C.F.R. 1.56 require-
ment that applicants submit information which a "reasonable exam-
iner" would consider important in deciding whether to allow a patent, 
with a new requirement to submit information "when an individual 
knows or should have known that the information would render unpat-
entable any pending claim in an application." 111 
It is not known whether this action taken by the PTO will act in 
accord with the CAFC's decisions in reducing litigation costs. The 
PTO's action may cause parties to adjudicate some of their claims at 
the administrative level and then turn to the courts to adjudicate claims 
like inequitable conduct charges. This may increase litigation costs 
through duplication of effort. It is likely that the hard-line approach of 
the CAFC will deter any frivolous claims. 
D. Consequences of a Higher Threshold for Intent 
As a consequence of the heightened intent threshold, the number 
of frivolous claims of inequitable conduct will be reduced. In the past, 
inequitable conduct was frequently raised by parties with the view that 
it would do no harm to at least try to satisfy the minimal requirements 
to support a claim. There has been every incentive for the defendant to 
make such allegations. Four considerations support the position that 
these claims will be reduced. 
First, a court's finding of inequitable conduct completely invali-
dates the patent. With low requirements of proof to satisfy such a de-
fense, a party will always try for the "knock-out" rather than suing to 
get only part of the patent to be held invalid. The higher level of proof 
will discourage this strategy. 
Second, the possibility of being awarded attorney's fees on the ba-
sis of the patentee's inequitable conduct has previously been too attrac-
tive to ignore with the low threshold of proof. 112 Courts normally can-
not award the winning party any part of his legal expenses other than 
some limited costs. With the higher intent threshold, alleged infringers 
will likely use other approaches before they allege a fraud defense. 113 
110. /d. 
Ill. /d. 
112. See 35 US C. § 288 (1982). 
113. The frequent invocation of FED. R. CIV. P. 11, used in conjunction with the higher 
intent standard for inequitable conduct. will accentuate this result. 
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This in turn should reduce patent procurement costs overall. 114 
Third, the low intent threshold of the past provided defendants 
with an easy way to discover the work-product of their adversaries. To 
adequately counter an inequitable conduct defense, attorneys for the 
patentee frequently had to present documents which otherwise would 
have been protected under the work-product doctrine or under the at-
torney-client privilege. The heightened intent standard substantially 
forecloses this avenue. 
Fourth, there will be fewer cases where truly meritorious patents 
are declared unenforceable because of a successful inequitable conduct 
claim. The rules regarding the duty of disclosure to the PTO generally 
benefit patent procurement by providing the patent examiner with the 
most pertinent prior art, often known only to the patent applicant. 
However, if the rules are construed in such a way that a simple good 
faith mistake will invalidate a worthwhile patent, the loss of the patent 
outweighs any benefit gained from the disclosure rules. By tightening 
the intent standard in requiring that the patent applicant have the ac-
tual intent to mislead the PTO, the protection of patents will increase 
and the public will directly benefit through the stimulation of incentive 
to commercialize useful patentable inventions. 
Perhaps most importantly, the higher intent threshold may help 
change the focus of many patent cases. In these cases, the concentration 
will be on trying the merits of the invention rather than concentrating 
predominantly on the ethics or morals of the patentee or the patentee's 
attorney. This is not to say that there should not be cases that concen-
trate predominantly on the morals or ethics of those involved in the 
patent process. It is to point out that the higher intent standard may 
help courts realize that they "should not so emphasize morals or ethics 
as to forget the [primary purposes of the patent system]." 1111 The stan-
dard will ensure that the interests of preventing fraud on the PTO and 
of promoting useful art and technology are more adequately balanced. 
III. CoNCLUSION 
In the past, most U.S. patent infringement actions also included the 
defendant's allegation that the patent holder acquired the patent 
114. Defending an inequitable conduct defense unquestionably adds to the cost of litigation; a 
reduction of the number of these defenses alleged will reduce the overall costs associated with 
patent procurement. A significant cost decrease may make patents available to more people. An 
expensive process will only be accessible by the rich or by large businesses. This will also promote 
the constitutional purpose of the patent system. 
115. See supra note 62. 
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through some form of inequitable conduct. 116 The defendant had every-
thing to gain and nothing to lose by this action. The CAFC decisions of 
FMC and Harita will limit this practice by favoring the strict applica-
tion of the intent element. The decisions have reduced and will con-
tinue to reduce patent litigation cost and will allow patent law to de-
velop in line with its constitutional purposes. The new intent standard 
will reduce the uncertainty that has heretofore encouraged litigators to 
make charges of inequitable conduct. It will allow for more uniformity 
in patent law, one of the congressional purposes behind the creation of 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Most importantly, it will 
more fully satisfy the purposes of the patent system-to promote sci-
ence and invention for the benefit of the nation and, in addition, con-
tinue to protect the public interest in maintaining the patent process 
free of fraud. 
Kenneth S. Barrow 
116. Many of these cases have been successful. See supra notes 82, 84, 87, 89. 
